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Yet, lacking even the modest vision party group feared exposure. But it was Pegler (New Rochelle, NY: Arlington, House, 1975), necessary to discern that Gorbachev wanted namely Khrushchev who had to be afraid. 180. to reform the system in order to strengthen This was a well-played game . . . . (p. 357) it, the Stalinists were soon disappointed. Through the medium of Sto sorok besed, Woodford McClellan is a professor of his- Molotov himself, however, hurrying now to the ghost of one of Stalin's prime henchmen tory at the University of Virginia and author keep his appointment in Samara, probably sends this message: Here I am, outside of Russia: A History of the Soviet Period. did not realize that his prophecy had come evolution, all muscle and fang and venom, true, and that at least for a while Andropov with just enough brain to synchronize them. would be the last to preach the old-time There are many like me. Molotov on the Atomic Bomb Truman decided to surprise us at Potsdam. So far as I recall, after a lunch given by the American delegation, he took Stalin and me aside and looking secretive informed us they had a unique weapon of a wholly new type, an extraordinary weapon . . . It s difficult to say what he was thinking, but it seemed to me he wanted to throw us into consternation. Stalin, however, reacted to this quite calmly, and Truman decided he hadn t understood. The words atomic bomb hadn t been spoken, but we immediately guessed what was meant. We also understood they weren t in a position to unleash a war. They only had one or two bombs, and when they blew those up over Hiroshima and Nagasaki they didn t have any left. Even if they had had some, they wouldn t have played any special role. We d been working on this since 1943. I was ordered to take charge, find someone who could build an atomic bomb. The Chekists [secret police] gave me a list of reliable physicists. I made my choice and summoned [Pytor] Kapista, an Academician. He indicated we weren t prepared, that the atomic bomb was a weapon not for this war but for the next. We asked [Abram] Iofe his position was likewise unclear. To make a long story short, there was the youngest, still quite unknown [Igor] Kurchatov, whom they didn t want to promote. I summoned him, we spoke, and he made a good impression. But he said a lot was still unclear to him. I decided to give him the material from our intelligence service the agents had done something very important. Kurchatov stayed in my office in the Kremlin several days, working on this material. This was sometime after the Battle of Stalingrad in 1943. I asked him, Well, what about it? I myself didn t understand anything about the material, but I knew it had been obtained from good, reliable sources. He said, It s excellent it adds exactly what we were missing. This was a fine operation on the part of our Chekists. They did well in getting what we needed at precisely the right time, when we had just begun this project. There was something in my memory, but now I m afraid I ve forgotten the details. The Rosenberg couple . . . I tried not to ask any questions about that, but I think they were connected with [our] intelligence . . . Somebody helped us a great deal with the atomic bomb. The secret service played a very big role. In America, the Rosenbergs paid for this. It s not excluded that they were involved in helping us. But we musn t talk about that. It might be quite useful in the future. Sto sorok besed s Molotovym, pp. 81-82 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 21 times rather trivial ones, pending receipt of completion, but Molotov insisted and pro- NOVIKOV explicit instructions from Moscow. In one ceeded to prescribe to Novikov the conclu- Continued from page 16 particularly vivid example Novikov writes sions he should reach in the report. In ship of state would turn. From that point that by the fall of 1945, he felt the political summing up this episode, Novikov notes forward, in his opinion, U.S. foreign policy climate had changed so radically from that that when he turned in the report on the day aimed to restrict Soviet influence and estab- of the war years that he could no longer Molotov requested, he could only symboli- lish American hegemony. report effectively without being recalled to cally consider it my own. 3 That Novikov indeed held such an Moscow for consultations and political re- Thus the "Novikov letter" might be bet- interpretation of U.S. policy can be con- orientation from the foreign ministry. Af- ter termed the "Molotov letter" if one gives firmed, not only from the published let- ter some months of pressuring Moscow to credence to Novikov s account. That ter, but also from unpublished documents recall him for such consultations, Novikov Molotov pushed Novikov to write the report in the archives of the USSR Ministry of finally received orders to return to Moscow and also served as its anonymous co-author Foreign Affairs. When in November 1945, in January 1946. There he was given the suggests that George Kennan is correct when after an Anglo-American summit confer- necessary political orientation to the new he asserts that Molotov needed the report ence, the Truman administration publicly international situation by Molotov per- either to gain the support of the East Euro- announced its desire to discuss with the sonally. It appears that Novikov felt inca- pean countries at the Peace Conference, or USSR the idea of the international control pable of sending correct reports without as ammunition in an internal Kremlin debate of atomic energy, Novikov cabled Mos- instruction in the proper assumptions and over Soviet American policy.4 The memoir cow that this decision approach from Molotov. Even in their inter- does not provide enough evidence to choose nal reports, then, it appears that Soviet dip- between these two possibilities, however, represents a new tactical approach in lomats were constrained to follow the pre- and Novikov himself probably did not know relation to the USSR, the substance of vailing interpretation of events in Moscow. exactly why his boss needed the report. Still, which can be reduced to the following: Such a practice drastically affected not only the memoirs place the letter in a clearer on the one hand, to use the atomic bomb the quality of information that the Soviet context, making it easier to interpret. as a means of political pressure to oblige leadership received, but also its ability to What strikes one as curious, after read- the Soviet Union to accept its [Wash- react to developments in the outside world. ing this account, is the rift between Novikov s ington's] will and to weaken the position Policy formulated in this sort of environ- contemporary analysis and the policies the [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ] |